the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemn must coimsider the conveniemmce ammd mmeeds of time coinnmunity when ruhmmg on apphcatiomms by bank holding companies to acquire hammk stmbsicharies. 1mm each ease, tIme Board mnust decide, first, wimetlmer tIme benefits ascribed by the applicant would be realized and secommcl, wlmether the proposed acqtmisition would furtimer time pmibhc interest.
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemn must coimsider the conveniemmce ammd mmeeds of time coinnmunity when ruhmmg on apphcatiomms by bank holding companies to acquire hammk stmbsicharies. 1mm each ease, tIme Board mnust decide, first, wimetlmer tIme benefits ascribed by the applicant would be realized and secommcl, wlmether the proposed acqtmisition would furtimer time pmibhc interest.
Jim its past decisiomms, tIme Board has fi)cmmsed 0mm sommme specific potential effects of holding company aeqimisitiotms imm assessimmg wimetimer time acquisition would fm Ertimer the conveniemmce ammd mmeeds of the commmmnmmmmity. A mmmmmmmber of these appear to be related to standard fimmammcial ratios commmptmted fromrm tIme financial statemmmemmts of banks. TIme impact of bammk imolding eomnpanies omm tlmese financial ratios has beemm immx'estigatecl ammcl widely reported imm a imost of bammk perfortrmammee studies. Timims, although there is no evidemmce timat the Board lmas used such stmmdies imm reaehimmg its decisions. imammk performmmaimce stmmdies could provide tmseftml immfornmation about hoidimmg eormmpammv aequ isitiomm 5
Time primary pmmrpose of tlmis article is to dctermimimme xx'hether perforimmammee stmmdies aetmiall~-are capaimle of idemmtifving perfbrmammcc chflerenees amommg banks amid, imence, whether tiu'~-are relex'aut to policy decisions about batik holdimmg eomnpanx aeqmmisitions . The first sectioim briefly reviews the conx-eniemmee ammd needs test as it relates to imammk acqimisitions ammd its inmpiemrmemmtatiomm by the Boarci of (Jovermmors . The secommd sectiomm smmmnmnarizes the results of previous perfi)rmanee studies. The third sectiomi investigates the commceptual difficulties with interpreting financial ratios as measures of bank perfornmanee. The final section draws conclusions about time imnplieations of'perfornmance studies fbr hotim haimk performance and public policy toward baimk holding compammies.
THE BOARD ANI) THE CONVENIENCE AN I) NEEDS TEST
Bammk holding comnpanies mnust apply to time Federal Reserve Board fhr pc'rmnissiomm to acquire a bank. 1mm ammaivzimmg tiit, application, the Board mntmst commsider the effect on the eommvemmienee and needs of time comnmmmunity ammd must weigim tlmis effect agaimmst ammtieomnpetitix'e efkcts stemmmmnimmg fronm aim acquisition. Accordimmg to time presemmt judicial mterpretatiomm of the Bank iloiding Conmpaimv Act, the Board canmmot apply competitive standards stricter timamm those in time anti-trust laws (see box).
The Federai Reserve Board's treatmmment of eommveniemmee ammcl needs in bammk hoiclimmg comnpammy applications imas been iimx'estigated tlmrouglm exammmimmation of publislmed Board orders reiatimmg to its various dleeisiomms. fummction; conseqmmentlv, the bemmefits cited b~'time Board, at best, are ad hoc 'approximmmations to time puhhc imiterest. This is generally the best that can be done whemm normnativ-e assessmemmts are reqmured.
A separate isstme timat the Board must thee is wimetimer the effects that it has associated with commveniemmce and mmeecls will aetuaiiy result iftime acquisition is 'approved. For examnpie, will an acquisitiomm actually ccnmvem't a staid bank intc a more aggm'essive lemmcier? Enmpiricai investigations of tins issue are available in a host of imank performance studies timat hate examined the effects of owmmersimip cimi bank opem'atumg characteristics, Tlmus, in this immstammce, positive studies of bammk operating cimaracteristics mimight provide sommme useful background fur the normative evaluations requireci of time Board.
RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE STUDIES
Performmmance studies have used difl'erent samples and empiricai approaches. Not surprisimmgly. they oftemm have attributed differemmt effects to bank holding eomnpany owmmership; they are remarkably consistent, however, in several important ways.
First, the studies have found virtually no diflèremmce imm financial ratios between indepemident amid bank holdingcOmpammy bamiks, prior to the acquisitiomm of the latter by hmohding companies.
Secommd, holding conmpanv banks gemmerahhv imohd a higher proportion cf their assets in loans and the obhgatiomms of states and municipalities, and a smmm'ailer proportion in cash amid U.S. governmnemmt securities, thami conmparahie inciepemidemit bammks.
Third, bammk holding cornpammies gemmeraiiv have mmot had a sizable efl'ect on time performance measures of their smmbsidiarv banks. Hoidimmg comnpammy ownership typicaLly has had a statistically sigmmificant effect oim onhv a small pm'oportion of time fimmammciah ratios inchucied in time variomms perf'ormmmammce studies. It has mmct been mmear the top of time list ofthctors that immfluemmce measmmrcs ofbammk perfornmammce.
6 Time simmghe exceptiomm is the studs' reavue amidI Jaekscmm m eamc'im eommmpsmteci beta cciefhiciemmts, "imiel i are jmmtemididnl 1cm immd,as (ire time ,-c'hmtive immmpo rtammec' mmf timc, imcielmemmclemmt variables i mm am mm imitipie regrc'ssiomm -Time'-hmitIm estm mmmateci sd's-c, ral regcsssiomm eqmmamticiims, so tlmeir results cam, mmmit [mc, so i'm mmmari zedi eommvc'-mm ic'mmmIx -1mm mmmos t of timeir regm-essiomms, 9-mm k hcilchimg c'ommm imammv cmiiem'slmi 1 m was cmi 'mm icidli mg om-id's5cr imnlmom-tammc-e -See Lmmeiite S-N-iavmmd, 
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portimmg that holding compammv hamiks are more highly' leveraged thamm immdependent banks.'
In other respects, time findings have beemm hess commsistent. Them'e is confiictimmg evicheimce on the effects of holciimmg compaimv ownership 0mm (1) service elmarges on demnammd deposits and interest rates on time anci savings deposits, (2) operatnmg expemmses, amid (3) financial leverage (the ratio of total assets or debt to capital). Table I summarizes time results ofpc3rformance stmmdies.
ARE BANK PERFOR%lANCE STUDIE:S ImEL 4 I4BI I CIĨDJ S FOR PF Bi i( POLICY?
Bank perfbrmammee is worth investigating, regardless of its implications for public policy toward bank holdimmg c'omnpammy aequisitiomms. If time methociology is valid, bammk performammee studies can imeip economists nuderstand how market chmar'actem'isties affect hammk operating resumits and why hammk imoiding compammies account for an immereasing share of banking activity. But timese studies also may indicate the hikeiimcxad timat somne of time bemmefits idemmtified in previoums Bcarci orders will resuit fm'om acquisitions of banks imy bank hohdimmg compammies.
Commsider again exhmibit A, the beimefits cited imm previom,ms Boarci orders approvimmg bammk imohdimmg comnpanv acqumisitions. Some of these benefits eouici be incasmmred by financial ratios: Time level of a specialized credit service could be represented by time ratio of a particumlar type of icmaim to the hoaim portfolio. Competition or the immterest rate on lcaamms ccnmici be represented by time ratio of immterest revemmue tc time loamm pcartfbhio. Aggressivemmess could he nmeasured b time ratio of total loans to total assets. Economies of scale conich ime measuredi by the ratio ofoperatiimg costs to total assets. The deht-to-eqtmitv ,'atio could he comnpnted frommm a hank's financial repom'ts~Otimer bemmefits are umnreiated to finammciai raticas; managenmemmt ''deptim'' or probhemns ofsmiccession, for exammmphe, eanmmot he mmmeastiredl by any ratio.
The samne fimmammciai ratios that coi.,ldi he umsed to measure eertaimm prospective benefits of hank imohding conmpammy acdiuisitiomms aisci appear imm performance studies as measures of hammk perfornmammce (see table 1).
Bammk performmmammce studies simare a common metimodohogy. Timev compare indepemmciemmt banks' ammch hank M f,mgo fm mmcl that timd' dl ifleremmc-e im mereamsc'd~m'itim IIme level of mnam-kc't eonc-emmtratici im -iii tlmcc macmid higimlv c-ummc-emmtratc'ct lmammki mig 'mm irked ii, imis sammmple, time raticm cal capital 1cm icmtai assets n-as 38 pereemmt Ic;sver iii imcmIdim mg comimpaov hamm ks cit imdcr factors hd,ici ecmmmstamm t, Timcc icmwd' ratio is dcqmI ivaiemit tcm higlmcc r icc'c' ,-agcc. S ice Jo1 mu J-M immgu, ''N-iammagccrisml \lc,tives. Market Struem,mrmcs audi the Perfimrmmmammecc cml limmidimmg Comimpammy Bam,ks, " Ecmnmoioie Iimqmiirmj (Septemmmher 1976), pp.
-4 11-24, imolding eommmpammy subsidiaries on time basis of various financial ratios, eotnpumted from time consohichated reports of i,meome amid condition that all itmsured banks periodicaiiy file with their regulators. These reports have standard formats that vary' ommiv slightly fur large bammks anch hamaks engaged in certaimm foreign enterprises.
8 lime same financial raticas, therefore, can be compared for all insured banks. l'lie perforrnaimce studies hypothesize timat "good'' or "bad'' perfcarnmance depemmds on time vahies ofthese finammciai ratios. Neitimer time reiatiommship between perf'ormammce amid time finammcial ratios, ,mor the predicted effects of bank hoichng conmpanies on time ratios, is derived theoreticaHv. Like time mmmeasures oftime public interest discussed previousiy', these ratios represent aci hoc mmmeasures of performnammce.
Are timese raticas reliable gmudes to either bammk performmmance or time pubic interest? It seemns not.°First, ticc empirical approaches emmmpioyed in performnammce stumdies have variomms shmorteommmimmgs. Second, timese ratios are distorted by clifferemmces imm accoummtiimg mmmethoci, organizatiomm'ai strumctmmre and pom'tfolio comnpositiomm that eammmmot he captured ha' baiammce sheet and imicome statenment data; moreover, timey' are mmot strictly commmparabie across immdepemmdemmt banks ammcl imoldiimg conmpany hammks.
Weakn.esses of Empirical Avproaches
Early perfbrmammce studies used' t-tests of difieremmces in time mmmeamms to evaluate time effects of imoidimmg cointm Ttie m-epurts cc,, scahciatmc time' Ii,mammeiai resimttm cml mm imamik's mimaimm office, smmimsidiamrics ammici imrammcclmes (if amp,-) -iii3auk pem'formnammce studies gccmmc'i-aiiv cud mmot draw pcihev immmpiieaticmmms fm'cm iii timeir fimmdimigs -Altimcimmgim earl'.-stmmciies mimade c'xpIjUt rc'lem'emmee do time staimmtcmry ecimmvccmmiemmec and mmeedis test, timeir ecmmmdim simmu s gccmmeraily were iimimited mc; cli seussions of Imank imerfkmrũ mammee -Later siimchccs did mmcmt refer to tlmcc eommvdcmm iccmicc, amid imccecis test, Mavmme wemmt scm far as tim say ttmat lmccr results "do mmot relate tca increased sccr'meccs car ccliiveniemmee ---'' See N-I av,me, ''Coimiparatis-e Shmdv," 1 m. 157. Ifshe 'las rmcfem-ring 1cm tIme Federal Rese,'ve Board's immterpretadicmmm cii time pmmlmlie imiterest, Omen sIme 'vas tcmo eim'emummspeet, d)mm tIme otlmer Ima,mci, Jaeksc;mm am'ccrrmcdh timat ii imlchmmg eomnpamiv aeciuisimicmns cmf "weil-mmmammaged" Imammks imrcmmmmise "few public bemmefits, " Sec Iaekscmmm, "N-i mmitih-aimk Hc,iciimmg Cummmpammies" p -26' Des 1 mite timccmr 'i'm mviiliogmi ess mm mmmake pohev rccc'omimmmmc'm iciatiunms, time autImcmrs of mmem-fcmrmmmmumc'e sdimches appam-emmtiy have arm implicit sdam,ciard fkmr deciding wimetlmer hammk bcildimig eommmpammiccs are hemmefieiai, Fcmr exanmmmlcc, Rciscc amid Sccmtd dlescrilmed a tmigimer raticm c;fcttier expemmses tci noel assets amcmommg imcmldimsg ccmnmjmammv hamiks as ''aiarnm8mg'' ann-I a icmssm'r m'aticm cmi farmsi real estate icmamms tcm total as sits amummg lmm;ldimmg comupammy Imammks a's-mi"cieficiemicv. " See Pc'tccr 5, Rosc' arid Wiiliamim L-Secmtt, "TImcc Pem'fkmrmnanmee cmi hianmks Acquired iv I lemldimig Commmpamiies," Recieic of Busimmem-s nod Eco,moomic Re-sec,iclm (Sprimmg 1979) , pta-29 amid 31, ,AiI time pccm'furmimammee studies refer to ''hammk pem'fcmrmimauce-"'Fhe tem'mmm immiplies am, objective or smmlmjective stammdiarci fir cii stiimgmuclmim mg supem'icmr fm'ommm immfccricir pccd'ormimamsc-e - n s Not statmstmcammy smgnm 4 mcant at the confmdenr.e 'eve selecmed by the authorlsm I lndmcates that the fmnar.c'al ratio was toghei tar belong company eanks deters parmbm 2 s Indicates that tie hnanc.ai ratmo was /ower for holdmnq company banks ceterms parmb 1 s 'The four fmnancmal ratmos mndmcamed as smgn:tmcant were the 'ndepender.t var.ables mu a n'umt,pledmscrmm.nant ana ysms that compared mndependent and hold ng corroary banks Jour yeats after the latter were acqumred oy homomng companmes tm 'The reported results refer to tie coefmmcment of the l'o'dmng company dummy varmabme In adnmtion. am' .nteractmor var abme between concentratmon ano the dummy varmable was posmt:ve and starmstmcally smgnmf'cant mn the equammon tar meal estate moans total assets aria negammve for busmness oans'totar assets and capmtal total assels 3 Mayne estimated equatmons tar cachet the tour years 1 969--72 Tie resm_;ts are reported here as smgnmfmcant ml the dummy varmable she usea entered an equatmon smgnmficantly 'n at least two ot the t ou' years tm The reported results reter to tne ooeftmcment of toe ho'dmrmg company dumrry varmable In adomt,on, smx different mnteractmon varmables mnvo m vmng the oumrny varmabme were statmstmcamly smpnmfmcant In at least one of the authors 13 equatmors In three equatmons. two ot the nteraclmon varmables were statmstmcai:y smgnmhcant. arid 'n five equatior's. ore of the mnteraetmen varmables was statmsfmcally smgnmtmcaflt 'In the t-tests of dmfferences !n the means homd'ng company banmis were touno to have had a higher ratmo of other eperaimng expenses to total assets n the secormd year followmng acau'smtmon by a 'ioldmng company, hut a ower ratio mn the thud year pammies Ofl the post-ac'cutmisitiomm pem'fom'mmiamice of subsicijam's-imamiks. 10 1mm attemnpting tcm ecmntrol ftmr the immilsieflee cmi cmthem' factors cm pc's'fcmnmmamic'e, these stsmdlies pairc'd hcmlclimmg ecmummlmanv banks with simmmilai'lv-sizc'dl indepemsdent bammks frcmmn the sammme mmmam'ket. These sttmclies failed to aclequateli-c'cmmmtrcml hmm' imauk size and market eima,'ac'-teristies, ammd high c'cmm'reiaticmns anmommg fimmaueial vanaimies mmmade smmmivariate tests of statistical sigimificance mmnintem'pretaimle,~Time umiivai'iatc, studies alscm eamm Ime criticized for ehmmminating fm'cmimm fimrtlmer studs' Imamiks timat ccmumld mmot Ime suitably paum'edl.
Mcmst recemit pem'fcmm'nmanee st,mdhles have used multivanate statis Neal teclmmmiqmmes, primmeipalls' multipleregressiomm analysis, 12 Ummti receimtlv. the multipleregressicmn mmmodels were simmgle-eqtmatiomi mcmdels svlueh w-'ere c'stimmmatecl using cmrdimmarv least squares regressicmmm ammalvsis. Tlm:se mncmdels ecmmmmpam'eci pem'forinamsee at a~mcmimmt 1mm timne, rather thamm cmv'er a pcmstac'c~tmisition pericmd. The effect of lmcmlding companies cmii imammk perfcmrmasmee was estlimmated 1w immelcmding a dmmmnmmmv vanaimle representing hcmlding eomnpanv owuerslmim. Some studies also included immteractioim vanalmles, 13 Time mnultiv'arjate studies imave several weaknesses. First, mmmost oftlmemmm presumed that perfcmrmnance differ- Thc, i'm termccticmmm variabies sverc, umrochic;ts cmf tIm e ci no, mmmv variable amid calmer immde 1 mcnmdemmt variables, Tlmey tested time hypothesis that aim iimdceimenciem,t variable's eflkrct mum imammk lmcrionimimumde depeimcleci om i dime himcmmk's fcmrmn of cmwnershmiim.
emic'esat a lmoint imm timne were due tcm c'hammges in perfornmanc'e after the aequisiticmn. Sec'cmd, some studies eosmtintmed tcm pair iimdepenclent and holclimig conmpanv lmauks. U 4 Third, ingim msmltiecmllirsearitv ins'olvimmg interaeticmn vam'ialiles mmmav Imave Imiased time ecmeffieient estimates, Finally, single-equatioim mmmodels igmcore immtem'-clependeimec, anmcmmmg lmank decisicmns, l,m Cradd~'and Kyle attein 1 mted tcm acc'cmtmnt fkmm' interdepenclemmcies anmomig finamieial raticms lmv estimmmating aim ad hoe system of 13 equatiomms, Althouglm it was an nmpm'ov'emmment over earlier models, thmeir uncmdel did not c:a~mture the hsvpcmthc'sized complexity cmf tile interdepemmdenee among Imank decisicmmms; furtherumom'e, their mterlmretation cmf eertaimm fimmammcial raticms was cjuesticmnaimle, mmD
ts-tortio-n,s' in Financial Rat-ics
Specific distortions iim the financial raticms can Ime traced to the nature mf time Imanking flrmmi amaci time Imank hcmldumg c'ompaimv, ammd tcm the eflec't cmi regulatiocm 0mm Imank prices. Banks sell maims' different prodsmc'ts amid acquire mnammy differenìt chepcmsit lialmilities. Revens,es and expenses depend osm imortfkmhio eonuimcmsitiomm, amid prices de 1 mench cmii the size, type and risk cmf the assets ammd liabilities in time portlohnm. Bank lnmlding ecmmpaimics are vertically acid horizcmmmndlv integrated corpcmrations, This fkmrmn oforganization pcmtentialiy affords real advantages, but alscm cm'eates aeecmtinting difierences between imidependent and stmlmsidiarv lmammks. i)eposit ceilings place a stattmtcmrv limit cmn tIme imriee cmf certain kimmcis cmf ciepcmsits, eausimmg lmammks tcm emmgage 1mm miomm-lmriee comnpetiticun for loanalmle finds. outed earher b', Job uso', ammdl N-I ccii, ster -'Flmc' mime cmfsin gice c-eqm mactim regression cuodc,is ummder dimcse cirecmmmmst;umccs i,mtrc,dcmces simmmuiltamieous equaticimm Imias into time ordimmar> iceast sqmmares estimnates of time regressicmmm coelficie,cts, Note that this eriticismmm does mmcmd pertain to time Jcuhmmccumm mmmcl N-i duster study, iu whm icim flmmanmciaI m'aticms entered only as iimdepemmdemmt variaimies in mm mmmuIdiple-discrimmminammt ammalysis. i<)Tlmc, am it hors-cimcmiee cif fimm mimic/al rmmticms tc rceprcescmm t iii~and cucmtimm it decisicmmcs led timcqmm tcu i'm tc nmmret cert;ci,i raticm,s ccc c~uami t i tic'sFor exmimim jmle, tIme macticmu cml tcutmcl ioamms tcm tcmtal as sets, mmmmcl salaries mcmmd wages to tmmtal mcssc'ts. "c-nc-ii, tcenimre ted mcs quamctitic-s cii nummtim cit aimd i'm pm it, m-espectivelv. The mint 1 ,om's iii te m' 1 mretatiomm cuf tlmc, m-aticu cuf total cmcpitmml to tcmdal risk mcssc,ts as time imamik' s iemcdimig h mint is clcmcmiutftml. Sec Timid,, mmmm. 7-8, charge for their products and pay for deposits as ratios of income statement items to balance sheet items. For example, the price paid for deposits has imeen incastmred by the ratio of immterest paid cmn deposits to total time and savings deposits, and thce price of loans lmv the ratio ofintem'est received cmii loaims to the lcman portfolio. There -are four reasons that these financial ratios are iuiadec~uateproxies for such prices.
P-rohirerns-with Ratios as 3-learnres of P-ace
Fiist, the ratios do mmcmt accouimt for a Imank's portfolio ccmmpcmsition. The sizes audI types ofa banks loans or deposits affect its operating costs and, hence, time prices the hank lmoth imays and charges, These effects are not captured by the ratios cmf income statement to balance sheet items. Such ratios are aetsmallv weighted averages of many different prices; they measure average revenues and averagc-m expenses rather thaim prices.
Second. the raticms include risk premniucns. Bammks can Ime expected tcm charge higher rates cmf interest cmms loans with greater perceived diefault risk. Banks that choose tcm mnake riskier loans will tend to have higher average revenue from loans (and also more lmad delmts), although they may charge the same mate as other banks for loans of ccmcn 1 marahmle clef-suit risk. Interest rate risk increases with the maturity cmf loans. Banks that ehcmose to make longer-term lcmans also will tend to have higher average revenue frocn loans.
Third, the raticms fail hm aceoumm t for the effects ofprice ceihismgs on scmmne deposits. \-Vheim the legal rate cml interest on de 1 mosits is fixed lmelosv the inam'ket rate, hmanks have an incentiv'c-, tcu incur imoim-immterest expenses tcm attract de 1 mosits. These additicmmmai ccmsts are ncmt eountedl as interest expense on a lmanks income statement, Ccmnsequemitly, the average expense raticm ucicierstates the true cost cmf deposits. This understatement is~mrolmalmly greater for scmune Imamiks timamm fcur cmthers, depending cmn the dc,mancl amid supply conchticmns for deposits imi chfferemit Imanking markets.
Fourth,, time ratios fail tcm account for ismterdependencies among certain prices. Some lmanking services are purchased in a package, f'cmr example, a lmcmrrovs'er's agreesnent to maintain a ccmmpensatiimg imalacmee with the lending Imank in returim for a lowcmr ncmmninal rate mf ( raclclv aim ch K>-Ic clid act-on'it fmur c'ei'taimm aspects cml imcmntfcml icu ccmm riImcusi timuu -Tim cmi n eqoat hum m hun the average i mi tc'm'c'st mactm' cumm Iiumsmi ci mid-I ucicci acu mmngm mm merits the raticms of iuu siimcsu, real estate -amid in stallmsmeimt lcmmcmm s tcu tcital assets-Their c-qmmaticumm fcmn time aye m'msge clc-4mcmsi t ran' i mmc:lsmcimcl am am-gummmmcmi its the rmmticms cul dIce cmiamici clcmmmcmsi ts tcm trut mci cle-1 mosits ammcl sam'-iu gs dc-1 mcus its tcu tcmtai tiumic' aim c 1 sam-immgs dc 1
mosits -See Ibid --mm 9, Thcesc' simc-cificatimmi us acre an iii, imrcuvdmms mcmm om'cmr timcmse cifcutlmcmr mmcm nib ,'imiaimccm st mmcli C's; m mcvc'rthcmlesu, times' Liii tcm mmccciimm ct fmmn mrmamm v mcslmects cml jmcuntftuiicu ccii ojmcmsiticuim-hit'1 cmdhimmg size chlk'rm-mmcc's 'vi thiii mcmi>-cmmtegcun-cif lcuamm u cur dc imcmsi isinterest on a loan. The true interest rate depends on the size of the compensating balance; however, the ratio measuring average loan revenue depends only on nomimial rates. Different average revenue and expense ratios are nmt necessarily dice tm different prices for a standard 1 mroduet. Systematic diffem-enees in portfolio composition, risk or cmther hmusiness strategies Imetween mdcimendent banks and holding eosn~manylmanks cause systematic differeimees in the average revenue and expense ratios. The ratios are ambiguous guides tcm the prices lmanks charge for products acid pay for deposits.
Probleums with Ratios-a-s I-lear-ares-of .Lffacieac-mj----- In performance studies, the term 'efficiency" is used tcm deserilme the relationship lmetweemm bmaimk costs amid some measure cmf cmutput, generally total assets hmut cmceasionallv total revenue. The relaticmnship bmetween tcmtal costs and cmutptct is cmieasured lmy-the ratio of cmperating expemcses tcm total assets cmr total revenue; the rdmlationship hmetweemm two particular elements of total cost is measured hmv the ratios ofsalaries and wages expense to total assets and other operating expenses to tcmtal assets. Smaller values cmf these raticms are interpreted as evidence of lower ccmst (i.e., snore efficient) 1 mrodueticun. This interpretathmn is invalid.
Bammks are multiprcmduet firimis that olmtain ftuids from a variety cml sources. Scmme imamikimmg prcmcluets and scmme sources cmfftmnds are more ecmstlv than cmthiers; therefore, the operatimsg expemise raticms ciepemid cm the ecmimmpcmsition of a Imank's 1 mortfcmlic. iresunmaimly, nmore costly portfolios yieldl higher revenues, so time raticm cmfcmperating revemsue to total assets depends-as well on imortfolum commipcmsiticmn. Because opem-atimig reventme also clepc-ends mmi the control time bank exercises over 1 mrice, nc ratio incorporating operatimig reveimue is aim adequate proxy fcmr a bamik's cost cmf prcmdueticmcm.
Baimk lmculding coumpanies are s'erticallv imitegratc,cl curganizations; the pareimt comnpany prcmvicles a variety ofsers'ices tcm its sulusidiarv bammks, 1cm sonic cases, thc'se services hmavcm beemm cemitm'alized in time hcmldling ccmmnpanv as au ecomiomny measure. Incuther eases, the salmcries cmf scmumce bank emplcmyees mime assigmmed arlmitrarily tm the imam'ent compasis-' instead of the subsidliary. In either dmase, the salaries cuf scmmne esnployees who provide services to a subsidiary-bank arc ears'ided omi the lxmoks cmi the hcmldimig eonipamiy instead cm 1 the hank itself. This ismtm'cmciuces a sy-stcemnatic clowmmward Imias iimto the reported salaridms and wages eximense cmfhmldiug ccmmnlmany imanks and, thus, a dlownward Imias intcm the salaries and wages expense raticm of hcmlding c'cmumpamms' lmanks.
Somne hank activities mire more lahmor-intemmsiye than otimers. Ccmnsequently. the salaries and wages expense ratio may vary systematically between holding coinpamiy' banks and independent hmanks due tcm differences in portfolio eosmmposition. This source cmfclistortiomm niay reinforce or cmffset the dcmwnwardl bias discscssed in the preceding paragra~mh.
Bank holdimmg companies usccallv charge their subsidiaries for services provided imy the parent ecmcnpm-iny. fhc'sdm charges, which are internal accounting transfors, mire referred to as mnauagemmiesmt fees. As the ''cmther cmperating expeumse" category on a hmam,k's incomne statenient includes management fees, this exlmesmse is hmiased tipward if hcmlding comnpammies charge their suhmsidiarv imanks fcmr services provided.
Probleams cith Pete-rage as a Meas-a-re of Capita-i itderpcaemj or Risk -Leverage is the ratio of delmt to capital. A hmank's levem-age inns' i-efleet the attitudes of owsiers or managers toward risk; it may Ime related to cmther factors as well. Perforsnance studies have advancedl cmne reason that holding compasmy imanks should lie less highly leveraged amid asmother that they' shouhdl he more highly leveraged, irrespective of attitudes towardl risk.
Sommme performance studies have argued that Imank holdimmg comimanies have greater access to capital niarkets than indepemmdent banks. As this advantage should translate imitcu a lcmwer ccmst cmf capital, banks owned lmv bmoldimmg companies shcnmld holdl mncmm'e capital iii relatiosm ttm delmt than independent hmanks. On the cmther hand, holding companies also are bmetter aimle than indejmeudent imamiks tc cliv'ersifv gecmgraphically. TS Other Imerfimrmance studlies have argued that gecmgraphically diversified holdimig companies reduce their risk imy lessening their dependence omm any single geographic area. With, this advantage, they shmcmulcl reqtcire less capital for any given level of debt. Bcmth argtmments have been tmsed to rationalize empirical results. Because the arguinemmts dm miot ummambigudmusly predict the efl'ect ofhmauk hcmlding companies on time ratio of debt to capital, leverage cneasicres neither capital adequacy ncmr risk.
Ussnuk hcmldimmg comsmpammies (macmm own mmciii-hamik s nbsidhiaricms imm mmmiv state, wlmereas Imanks are limited Imy state turammeiming restrictioumsBanks caimnot icmcatc cuffices lim states cmtimer tliamm their hcmmmmc states, amid in socmme states are himnited to ccmudocting all or mimost of their lmccsimiess fromi, a single office, 1mm states that restrict imrammchmiumg, mnmuitiimmank holdiusg comimpamiies camu circummmvemmt legal restrictions 0mm the geognaphicah extent of a imank's operation by acquiring cmr chartering imanks iii chifereot areas of time state, Thus, to scume extent they are suimstitutes for Imrammch banks, Gem-tam accounting ccmnveutions cmhscure any counparison of the capital of holding company banks and independent imanks. I--Ioldimig cosnpamiies cami borrow fiurmds to augmnesit the reported capital of their subsidiam-y imanks. (This practice is known as doulmle leveraging.) For accounting purposes, the funds are capital to the hmasik and debt to the holding company; therefore, the effect of the hmorrcmwing is tcm increase the leverage ci the parent ccmmmipan~amid decrease the leverage of the subsidiary Imank. Does douimle leveraging improve the capital position of the hmam,k? To put the questicmmi differently, is a imamik that lmcmrrcmws through its parent hicmlding company actually expmsed to less risk thiami aim independent Imank that incurs time same deht itself? The answer depemids ultimately on whether a suimsidiary Imank is insulated from the financial proimlenis cmf its parent company-On one hand, the Imank is a separate legal entity; the holding compamiy is prohihmited legally from draining the batik cf its assets or capital. 0mm time other hand, the operating policies of the imamik are dictated b the parent company; if faced with insolvency, time holding conipany is likely tc operate time imasik in a risky manner in an attempt to meet the im,terest~maymnents on its debt. It seems that the practice of double leveraging obscures time distinction between delmt amid calmital, causing an overstatesmient of time capital jmcmsitious of sulmsidiarv' hmauks arid an understatement of risk.
Prohle-ri-as-witlm Rat-ios as iclensa-c of Po-rtfotio Composition -Several portfolio raticms are used in 1 merfcmrniance studies. They measscme time prcmpom-ticmns of tcmtal assets heIdi as Iciamis, cash, TI. S. goversmsnent securities amid so forth, amid the proporticmmis cmf the loan portf'cmlio dcvcmted to cliffem'ent kisids of loans, such as hmusiness, real estate audi installmneumt loamms. Differences in portfolio mmmix mire partly respcmnsilmle lcmr the hmiases iii tither fimiancial ratios.
The portfolio ratios are less subject to potential distortioum than cmther fimiancial raticms. Nevertheless. certam portfolio ratios mnay be biased due to the dlivisiomi of a bank hcmlding cocnpany iuito bank audi ncmmi-bank subsidiaries. This divisiomi creates reporting differences between holding company amid independent banks. For examnple, a mortgage loan by an independent bank wcmnld he reported on the bank's call report, but the same loan imy a holding company's mortgage subsidiary would appear on the Imooks ofthe non-bank subsidiary. Although non-bank subsidiaries account for a small proportion of total holding con)pany activities, time legal and accounting divisions may distort particular portfolio ratios, such as the raticm of real estate loans to total loans.
